

Writing Contest

**Public Affairs Mission Staffing Alternatives for
the Bosnia Contingency**

Lt. Col. Geoffrey P. Jones
Seminar 14
2 July 1999

Abstract

The Army will need to consider alternatives for staffing the public affairs mission for the Bosnia contingency after it mobilizes the last available reserve component (RC) public affairs units. At the present mobilization and deployment rate, the Army will run out of reserve component public affairs units for this contingency by 2002, under the mobilization authority in effect and USAREUR's present and projected requirements. This paper presents the background leading up to the present state, and discusses possible alternatives for continued staffing of the public affairs mission.

Public Affairs Mission Staffing Alternatives for the Bosnia Contingency

The Army will need to consider alternatives for staffing the public affairs mission for the Bosnia contingency after it mobilizes the last available reserve component (RC) public affairs units. At the present mobilization and deployment rate, the Army will run out of RC public affairs units for this contingency by 2002.

America's Army depends on the reserve components to accomplish its missions. In a number of functional areas, the greater number of units are to be found in the reserve components. This is especially so in the area of public affairs (PA). (See Figure 1.)

Background

The public affairs mission for this contingency has been met almost exclusively by RC units. Eighty-two percent (61 of 74) of the Army's PA units are in the RC. While active component (AC) units are deployed at the discretion of the Army, both as to iteration and duration of tours, RC units can be called up involuntarily for no more than a total of 270 days during a given PSRC, according to Jones, McCullough, and Ruegemer (1998). (Note: present policy for AC units is six-month tours, with repeat tours spaced by at least a year.) Through July 1999, under the December 1995 Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) (the mobilization call-up authority in effect), we have deployed -- used up, in effect, since they can only go once -- two-thirds of our reserve component public affairs units. U.S. Army Forces Command

(FORSCOM) as the force provider has sourced, mobilized and deployed, in whole or in part, 44 component public affairs units (five active and 39 reserve) in seven separate rotations for the three Bosnia contingency operations, JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE), JOINT GUARD (OJG) and JOINT FORGE (OJF). (Note: this count does not include partial units that have gone – units that were derivatized [i.e., cross-leveled] to flesh out units mobilized under-strength. These derivatized units are still eligible to mobilize under their own flags, so are counted as part of the one-third remaining.) (See Figure 2 for unit deployments.)

The RC PA units mobilized for this contingency serve for 270 days (nine months). About 220 of those days are actually spent on the ground; the rest are spent deploying and redeploying.

The earliest active component [AC] presence, including two AC Public Affairs Detachments [PAD], overlapped with the first PSRC rotation. In the beginning, there were 11 units deployed, from all three components (i.e., AC [two units], Army Reserve [USAR] [five units] and Army National Guard [ARNG] [four units]). In the beginning, the PA unit structure in all three of the contingency's venues, i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina /Croatia, the Hungary National Support Element (NSE) and Germany (Central Region (CR) was more robust – about double – what it is now.

Types of Units in the Force

The 74 PA units in America's Army are divided into four types: Public Affairs Operations Centers (PAOC) (*formerly Press Camp Headquarters [PCH]*),

Broadcast Operations Detachments (BOD) (*formerly Broadcast Public Affairs Detachments [BPAD]*), Mobile Public Affairs Detachments (MPAD) and Public Affairs Detachments (PAD). (*Note: public affairs unit structures and nomenclatures are evolving. See FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations.*) Only 13 units, or 18 percent, are in the active component. The remaining 61 units, or 82 percent, are in the reserve components, with 33 units in the National Guard and 28 in the Army Reserve.

There are seven PAOCs, with 28 to 33 soldiers each. Four of these are in the USAR, and three are in the ARNG. The PAOC has nine HMMWVs and audio-visual equipment sufficient to produce radio, television and print products for an internal audience as well as resources to credential, brief, escort and support visiting media. The PAOC has a command section, an escort section, a briefing section and an audio-visual section (How the Army Runs, 1997). Only one PAOC deployed for OJE, and this was a USAR unit that staffed the Joint Information Bureau in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina during the first rotation. The consensus from U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was that the unit was too big for the operation. At present there is a PAOC(-) of 25 soldiers deployed for OJF.

There are four BODs, with 27 soldiers each. These are all in the USAR. The BOD is organized into two broadcast teams and a maintenance section. Its transportation assets include four HMMWVs, and its audio-visual equipment is sufficient for the BOD to establish and operate field radio and television broadcast facilities (How the Army Runs, 1997). Three BODs deployed, all to

Tuzla, Bosnia; the fourth, which the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) is in the process of standing up, has not been ready to deploy. There is still a requirement for broadcasters for the mission, but since there are no BODs available, broadcasters are being sourced individually from the active and reserve components to form ad hoc teams.

There are 41 MPADs, with 18 to 20 soldiers each. An MPAD can support a division or corps headquarters or be broken down into five-man PADs. Their equipment and capabilities are similar to a PAD but more robust (How the Army Runs, 1997). There is only one MPAD in the AC, and it deployed for OJG. Also, several soldiers of the AC unit deployed to Bosnia at different times to fill individual requirements, and many of the unit's other soldiers continue to provide media training for units and soldiers processing through Fort Benning. There are 23 MPADs in the ARNG (17 have been deployed) and 17 MPADs in the USAR (11 have been deployed). MPADs serve in Bosnia/Croatia, Hungary and Germany, and are assigned as high as USAREUR HQ in Germany and down to brigade level in "the box" (i.e., Bosnia, Croatia and Hungary) where they are further farmed out in teams to support base camps.

There are 22 PADs, with five soldiers each. The PAD comes with its own transportation (two HMMWVs) and sufficient still and video equipment to produce print, radio and television products for internal audiences. The PAD typically supports a brigade-sized unit (How the Army Runs, 1997). There are 12 PADs in the AC, six in the ARNG and four in the USAR. Of these, four AC PADs have been deployed, as have individual AC soldiers from some of the

remaining AC PADs, the AC garrisons and the imbedded affairs shops in the AC divisions. (Filling these individual requirements has had serious impact on the readiness of the AC PA structure.) Five ARNG PADs have been deployed and two USAR PADs have been deployed. PADs, like MPADs, have served in Bosnia, Hungary and Germany (though none are presently deployed for OJF), and have performed a variety of missions.

Unit Employment

The Bosnia contingency has been characterized variously as an Operation Other Than War (OOTW), Stability and Security Operation (SASO), or Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC), depending on the Army parlance in vogue. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/GUARD/FORGE is not and has not been a Major Theater of War (MTW) as defined in the Army's war plans. In meeting the PA requirements for MTWs, the Army references the formal war plans to create the appropriate support structure. The appropriate PA support structure is prescribed by PA doctrinal "battlefield laydown." There are planning associations that link units by name. For a contingency or OOTW like OJE/G/F where an ad hoc, task force organization is put together, logic would suggest that the battlefield laydown should emulate doctrinal laydown for MTWs where like-level forces are employed. Yet USAREUR, in designing the public affairs support structure for OJE/G/F, generated requirements for a robust PA presence that arguably exceeded doctrine. Not only have units been deployed to Germany as well as Bosnia and Hungary, they have also been

pushed further down-echelon than is prescribed by PA doctrinal battlefield laydown.

USAREUR's motive in designing the structure was its strategy for avoiding historical shortfalls perceived in public affairs support. Based on analysis of previous operations such as URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, USAREUR's intent in the Bosnia contingency was to balance the media's demands for unlimited access with military concerns for operational security and limited support capability, while meeting USAREUR's specific goals for mission accomplishment. These goals include:

- granting broad and deep access for the media to the operation and associated personnel;
- keeping soldiers and family members informed;
- communicating assurances that safety and tactical soundness were primary CINC issues;
- communicating the quality of the leadership and soldiers for this mission; and communicating the quality and state of art of the equipment deploying.

MPADs in Bosnia are parceled out in teams to support base camp commanders, to conduct news acquisition and media facilitation missions, to produce the Talon magazine, and to staff the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) in Tuzla; they also provide individual soldiers for "eachee" missions such as liaison to HQ in Sarejevo. The PAD (with two augmentees) in Hungary serves a full-spectrum PA mission for the National Support Element/Intermediate Support Base in Taszar, facilitating the media from a

media center, producing the American Endeavor magazine and conducting news acquisition missions. The mission of the MPAD in Heidelberg has been to beef up the USAREUR PAO for the heightened public affairs activity in Europe due to the Bosnia contingency. In Heidelberg, the MPAD's soldiers work in media analysis, production, PA plans and policy and are sometimes sent on missions "downrange."

Competition for Assets

Operation JOINT FORGE is now not the only game in town. Until now, the operation has had the luxury of robust staffing and focused attention. It remains to be seen whether the initial slate of AC PA units deployed to Kosovo will require backfill by RC units. USAREUR could generally get the assets it asked for, for the Bosnia contingency. Given that we'll have gone through two-thirds of our PA reserve units to date for this mission alone, it is readily apparent that we'd have to staff such operations much more thinly if other OOTW or a MTW arose. Significantly, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, which projects the force structure needed in the future, reveals some shortfalls in the present public affairs structure for meeting a two MTW scenario. The TAA process is supposed to identify and remedy such problems, however.

We should recognize that RC PA units have a very good chance of deploying for any contingency if the recent operational past is any guide to the future. Of course, if there is an MTW and a mission-capable unit is on the planning association for it, then it's very likely that unit would go. But suppose there is an extension of OJF, or yet another contingency where we

tailor an ad hoc organization. For the Bosnia contingency, we've sourced the best available units. For a follow-on contingency elsewhere or for a continuation of the Bosnia operation, we'll have to reach into the pool of units we have left – the remaining third yet to deploy for the contingency. At present those are our less-ready units. Ready or not, they will have to be made whole and ready. This could mean intensive training and cross-leveling personnel and equipment from other units or augmenting with individuals. Deploying those less-ready units next is only fair to those who've already been, recognizing the turbulence deployments cause in reservists' civilian careers and families.

To meet USAREUR's unit requirements, FORSCOM has been and will continue to be creative, in some cases tailoring slices out of PAOC units to staff MPAD and PAD requirements. This has only been done where we can justify it by PAOC METL match-up – for example, the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC)/Joint Information Center (JIB) mission in Tuzla and the media center mission in Taszar, which are missions compatible for PAOC-trained troops. FORSCOM understands that sending slices vs. full units is a painful strategy, violating unit integrity as it does. But we have to look at the whole mission over a long time, and conserve on our much-deployed -- and fast dwindling -- supply of MPADs. And the remaining MPADs are in rough shape. All will need cross-leveling of personnel and/or equipment from units that have already gone and been refreshed, or from units even more broke.

Alternatives to Consider for When We Run Out

The Army faces some difficult choices when it runs out of RC PA units for the Bosnia contingency under the present PSRC. At the present rate, if USAREUR's present requirements remain steady state, all of the Army's RC PA unit flags – PAOC, MPAD, BOD and PAD -- will have served in the Bosnia contingency by the 12th rotation (see Figure 2). The 12th rotation will begin in early 2002. After the 12th rotation, under this PSRC, there will be no more RC units to send. At that point, several options under discussion present themselves, all of which would have serious ramifications that would have to be carefully weighed. Options include:

Change the Policy?

First let's examine the policy for the mobilization authority in effect for Bosnia, so units could be mobilized again. In 1998, Jones et al. discussed the mobilization call-up authority for the Bosnia contingency, the December 1995 Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). The policy set for PSRCs is that units can only be called up only once under a given PSRC. This policy is set by the Department of Defense per Section 12304 of Title 10, U.S. Code (USC), which governs accessing RC soldiers onto active duty. Title 10 provides the legal authority for mobilization. Under Title 10, PSRC and Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD) are the two methods available to access RC soldiers onto active duty in support of contingency operations and operations. A PSRC is authorized by the President when it is determined that it is necessary to augment the active forces for an operational mission. Currently, there are

three PSRCs in effect: one for the mission in Bosnia (since December 1995), one for Southwest Asia operations (since February 1998) for the recent and continuing Iraqi threats, and one (the latest) in support of the Kosovo mission. Although by law, the PSRC authority allows for the activation of up to 200,000 reservists at any one time, the Secretary of Defense will establish ceilings, or caps, for each service that often totals much less than 200,000. For example, the Army's portion of the Bosnia PSRC cap is 6,000. Under PSRC, each reservist is limited to no more than 270 days of involuntary service. Until a recent legislative change (Nov 97), only members of the Selected Reserve, IMA and TPU, were accessible under PSRC. With the legislative change, up to 30,000 of the Individual Ready Reserve members (who must volunteer for the mobilization category) can then be involuntarily activated as individuals. (Regulations and policies are still under development for this category.)

The policy for "only once" call-up for a given PSRC is not locked in concrete. McCullough (1999) described Army exceptions to the policy for two occasions -- once for a general officer who had only been mobilized for 180 days for his first mobilization, who then volunteered to be involuntary mobilized for the remaining 90 days. (He was also extended on a Contingency Temporary Tour of Active Duty when he finished his second mobilization, so he could continue to lead his mobilized soldiers for their full mobilization period. The other exception to the policy was for the Southwest Asia (SWA) call-up, for the 310th Chemical Company. As a one-of-a-kind unit, the 310th has been vital for the continuing flareups involving Iraq. Parts of the unit were called-up

for 120 days under one mobilization, and then two of the same parts for another 22 days and seven days, respectively. These examples, by their singularity, suggest that policy exceptions for the PSRC are not lightly entertained. The other main issue to consider when considering iterative call-ups under the same PSRC is the likely negative impact this will have on retention. So far, the jury's out on whether soldiers in units facing recall will vote with their feet. In the writer's estimation, the Army views rather myopically some evidence it has accrued to the contrary. And the AC mindset seems as yet unable to grasp that RC soldiers may be on a different agenda. From what the writer has heard from senior leadership, the prevailing attitude they share is that "they'll go if their ordered – this is the Army, and that's their job; that's what they signed up for." For anyone associated with the RC, this is overly simplistic. It should be self-evident that anyone who wanted to be constantly deployed on iterative tours would have joined the regular Army.

Gen. Creighton Abrams engineered the present tri-component mix of the Total Army after the Vietnam War. His intention was to structure the mix such that the Army could not prosecute operations without the RC. His purpose in creating this dependency was to insure that mainstream America's sons and daughters, along with mainstream America's approval and support, would accompany the Army to war. The key assumption here is that the RC was and would continue to be composed of vital, contributing members of society, with a stake in America's military outcomes. Abrams sought to avoid future debacles like Vietnam. That conflict saw mainstream America's national will

and commitment fail before a purpose they questioned, and saw mainstream America revile and excoriate a military they typecast as shiftless, stakeless, unfranchised conscripts led by an out-of-touch professional cadre, all at cross-purposes with the mainstream American values prevailing.

Since 1989, Reimer (1999) says Army OPTEMPO has increased 300 percent. Abrams cannot have envisioned that the RC would be called upon and depended upon as much as it is today. Indeed, an RC soldier joining in the '70s and '80s would have said that getting mobilized once, maybe twice in a 20-year career might be reasonable. (The writer was 17 years in the RC before his first call-up). Nowadays, with the OPTEMPO since the Gulf War so high, the trend in thinking is that those in the RC ought to expect activation every four years or so. Recently, a DA working group reviewing HQDA mobilization policy under the three PSRCs in effect was discussing this likelihood, since USAR units average approximately 33 percent turnover each year, and ARNG units have a 20 percent turnover. The thought is that each unit would be completely turned over at the four-year mark, according to McCullough (1999). This may be true for combat (CBT) and combat support (CS) units, but hard-to-fill, low-density MOS combat service support (CSS) units (e.g., USAR public affairs, fire fighting, movement control, and target acquisition units, precisely the kind the Army needs to mobilize most) tend to have low turnover; soldiers often spend the majority of their RC careers in these units, for lack of other RC opportunities available locally to accommodate their low-density MOSs. How long will they stay in RC units if they have to deploy every three or four years?

We may soon find out. Some relief is in sight under the TAA process. Another five or six MPADs are slated to be created in response to shortfalls identified for the two MTW scenario; having more RC PA units enables the NCA to lessen the OPTEMPO of all units.

Implementing a new Bosnia PSRC?

This option raises the same issues as the option above, but it circumvents the policy issue presented by Title 10 regarding iterative call-ups. The effect on unit retention would be the same.

Creating Ad Hoc RC Units

At present only units may be involuntarily mobilized under a PSRC. So another option is cobbling together and involuntarily mobilizing ad hoc units from not-previously-deployed Troop Program Unit (TPU) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) soldiers, and the newly created pool of 30,000 “involuntary” soldiers in the IRR (i.e., those less than two years out of active duty who “volunteer for the involuntary” category). Of course, there are also the obligors in the IRR; they can also be included in this option. These categories are liable for involuntary PSRC call-up. In the case of IRR obligors and TPU soldiers (assuming they are “refreshers” newly augmenting previously call-up units), such individuals can be called up involuntarily if they are placed in “derivative” units of at least two individuals; the aggregate of such derivative units could form full PA units. (Derivatizing is being done now to cross-level troops into units mobilizing under strength.) Mobilizing IMA soldiers doesn’t create real difficulties. As far as the IRR pool discussed above, there cannot be

many 46-series MOS soldiers eligible, since the overall pool of IRR 46 series soldiers is less than 300 (see Figure 3). The Bosnia mission staffing effort may well resort to creating ad hoc units before other options are employed, since, though it requires some micro-management, it's orthodox from a policy standpoint. The problem is, it's not a long-term solution.

TTAD

There is a fairly lucrative pool of qualified individual reservists, whether in TPU, IMA or IRR category, who could volunteer to fill individual requirements for contingencies and operations. There is no guarantee of sufficient response, however, and identifying the talent is only part of the problem. There are also funding and regulatory hurdles.

To support contingency operations and for other operational requirements, RC soldiers can only be called onto active duty (i.e., volunteer) under mobilization or Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) authorities, according to Jones, et al. (1998). TTAD, which is governed by AR 135-210, is funded by an active component appropriation (MPA) and is for active component missions. It is not to be confused with Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), which is very similar to TTAD, but is governed by AR 135-200 and is funded by a reserve component appropriation (RPA or NGPA) for a reserve component mission. Both programs require the soldier to volunteer for the mission through the use of DA Form 1058-R, and tours are normally between 31 and 139 days in length.

Operational TTAD is allocated to Army Component Commands and MACOMs to support their operational requirements. Traditional CINC Activity (TCA) TTAD is allocated to the CINCs to support their requirements. The allocations only provide pay and allowance support. The command requesting the RC support is responsible for all travel, per diem and other related costs from their Operations and Maintenance account (OMA).

The Army TTAD accounts are provided minimal funding each year due to competing demands for limited funds. TCA TTAD was funded at \$9.5 million and Operational TTAD at \$3.0 million in both FY97 and 98. This equates to approximately 140 and 45 man-years respectively, depending on the rank of the soldier doing the required mission. As a result, commands must manage and execute these very limited TTAD man-years judiciously and wisely for their most crucial requirements. Additionally, commands must be familiar with all alternative sources of funding for special requirements, such as counter-drug, intelligence, exercise support, etc., which have their own funding sources.

A special type of TTAD known as Contingency Operations TTAD (COTTAD), was established in FY98 to supplement mobilization authorities. COTTAD is intended to be used only for those soldiers in low density, high usage MOSs and AOCs after the soldiers have been mobilized under PSRC authority. It allows for the RC soldier to voluntarily convert from PSRC authority to COTTAD authority to remain on active duty after their 270 days of authorized PSRC duty has ended. Current mobilization policies still apply to

COTTAD, e.g., the requirement must be validated by the CINC and AC soldiers remain the priority for filling requirements.

Title 10 provides the legal parameters. Due to fiscal constraints, the Army's current guidance when sourcing CINC-validated requirements is that the active component will serve as the primary force provider. Only in those cases where there are no other alternatives will a RC soldier or unit be considered. In addition, as discussed above, once a reservist has been mobilized under a specific PSRC authority, the soldier cannot be mobilized again under that same authority. If the RC soldier volunteers and a successful case has been made that an AC soldier is not available to fill the requirement, then with the proper documentation, the RC soldier can be brought onto active duty under COTTAD, as described above.

A TDA Structure

Another option is creating a Table of Distributions and Allowances (TDA) public affairs structure in the theater, in lieu of requesting rotations of active component or mobilized reserve component public affairs units. Individual active component soldiers would move in and out of theater jobs, ostensibly for yearlong unaccompanied tours, on a permanent change of station (PCS) move basis. However, we must consider this option within the larger context of staffing the entire American military presence in the theater on a permanent basis, as in Germany, via TDA or permanently emplaced Table of Organization (TOE) structures. The staffing pattern for Korea is perhaps a better example;

many Korean theater tours of duty are “hardship,” one-year unaccompanied tours, as would be Balkan tours.

For the public affairs problem at least, Lt. Col. M. L. Austin (personal communication, June 21, 1999) said this concept has been aired between the Department of the Army’s Office of the Chief of Public Affairs and Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe. Lt. Col. (P) H. Bell (personal communication, June 23, 1999) described how a TDA structure has been the solution for manning the Armed Forces Network (AFN)-Balkans mission since SFOR2, which began in 1997, when the inventory of Broadcast Operations Detachments (BOD) was exhausted. Regarding TDA structures for the remainder of the PA mission, Lt. Col. M. L. Austin (personal communication, June 21, 1999) said no decisions have been made. Lt. Col. (P) H. Bell (personal communication, June 23, 1999) said that creating TDA structures is the purview of MACOMs; MACOMs “own” TDAs because they pay the bill to fill the authorizations. USAREUR’s (or any MACOM’s) big issue with creating a TDA structure in the theater, according to J. Donovan (personal communication, June 14, 1999) is that USAREUR cannot simply create new Army organizations out of whole cloth; it must create them at the expense of some other TDA structure. It’s a zero sum game; there are caps on the total numbers of people in the Army, and these caps are the main constraints on creating new organizations. So far, the military powers-that-be have not been compelled by events to seriously explore such a politically sensitive course, since reliance on active and reserve component units has worked so far. However, if, as the

Balkan theater matures, the NCA determines that we are there for the long haul, we must move the permanent TDA/TOE presence option to the front burner for consideration.

Using AC Soldiers Units Only

Why use RC units at all? Why not rely solely on active component soldiers and units? First, there just aren't enough units. The current level of staffing for the Bosnia contingency would require the simultaneous deployment of all 12 MTOE PADs in the AC structure, and they are already stretched to the limit as it is for other operations, contingencies and exercises. AC PA unit OPTEMPO is one of the highest in the Army. (For AC PA unit deployments, see Figure 4.) The TAA process may create some relief here by creating more units.

As to staffing the effort with individual TDA soldiers, this is and has been a partial solution for staffing individual positions, but again, there aren't enough TDA PA soldiers to go around. Using a TDA soldier for a contingency creates a hole in the losing command, said J. Donovan (personal communication, June 14, 1999). PA TDA staffs are austere at best, and deploying a TDA soldier from one to a contingency means some PA functions in his or her absence have to be shared out to the remaining staff, or won't get done at all. Funding constrains the hiring of temporary civilians, and there usually isn't enough TDY money available to backfill the TDA soldier with a reservist (other than two or three weeks of annual training money for IMAs, if the command is authorized them). Besides, why would you backfill a TDY soldier with a reservist? The reservist should deploy to the theater instead.

Using DA Civilians

According to J. Donovan (personal communication, June 14, 1999), DA validates a number of civilians every year to deploy to hazardous locations, so there is precedent for this option, and the public affairs function is no exception. In fact, as the CSS system evolves, we can expect shifting of more support tasks, including public affairs, from the uniformed services to the Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (Combat Service Support, 1995). CSS planners must integrate (civilians) into the support plan to maximize the efficiency of the system (Combat Service Support, 1995). Civilians must volunteer to be placed in harm's way, and can even be armed. They attend the same school as the soldier for public affairs training – the Defense Information School -- and the decision whether to have a green-suiter or a civilian in a given PA position is largely up to the command, so in many cases they are interchangeable. However, the same problem exists for deploying civilians as for deploying TDA soldiers – it creates a hole in the losing command. But this option should certainly be utilized on a limited basis.

Other services

Another option is using other services' public affairs personnel, whether AC, RC or civilians. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Coast Guard service members all are trained at the joint Defense Information School, so can and have dovetailed fairly easily into other service PA slots. Individuals, not units, are the targets of consideration with the other services. With the exception of naval reserve PA units, none of the other services have PA units. The naval

reserve PA units are also structured much differently than Army PA units. They are “rank-rich,” without enough “doers” to depend on for the Bosnia mission. They would be a good source for individual volunteers, or for derivatizing two or more involuntarily, for staffing some positions in Sarejevo and Tuzla. The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Tuzla began with a staff of service members from all the services. As the mission has stabilized, the JIB has become almost exclusively an Army domain, but in the writer’s estimation this has more to do with the predilections or prejudices of the Task Force Eagle commander and the habit of staffing from DA than it does with the compatibility of other services to do the mission. Staffing the JIB with other services’ personnel is probably more practicable than staffing PA missions in the Army base camps in Bosnia; JIB personnel escort and brief media from a strategic and operational level perspective, whereas base camp PA personnel focus on telling the tactical Army story. The staffing requirements in Hungary are more suited to green-suiters also. USAREUR has flatly stated that the mission currently staffed by Army MPADs in Heidelberg is a green-suit-compatible mission only. Of course, using other services’ TDA personnel presents the same problems for them as it does for the Army.

Contractors

Contractors could be used to staff the effort, at least in part. Certainly, contractors have been employed by our Army for as long as we’ve had a military – the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is firmly entrenched. As military force structure is reduced, the use of contractors for

technical support will be widespread, according to the Army's Combat Service Support manual, FM 100-10. McAllister (1999) says the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is publishing new guidelines for what military jobs civilians can handle. McAllister (1999) quotes Jayson L. Spiegel, executive director of the Reserve Officers Association (and former deputy assistant Army secretary) as saying that under those new rules as many as 400,000 military jobs, many of them battlefield support positions typically filled by reservists, could be given to contractors. One question in the minds of many is whether contractors would show up for work under hostile fire. The main question to be resolved first is, what part of the public affairs function is inherently "governmental"? Functions classified as "governmental-in-nature" would be fenced from contractors. Donovan (1999) explains that such PA duties as production work and writing speeches and articles could be contracted out, but that representing and advising commanders and analyzing media are emphatically governmental-in-nature. One can envision a contracted Brown & Root public affairs team performing quite handily, composed of ex- and retired military and civil-service public affairists performing non governmental-in-nature tasks, augmenting military and civil-service personnel doing that which is inherently governmental.

Conclusion

So how do we continue to staff the Bosnia contingency PA mission? We'll run out of RC units during 2002, under this PSRC and USAREUR's present and projected requirements. Assuming that the once-only call-up limiting

policy for the PSRC will not change, and that a new PSRC is not in the offing, then the most reliably consistent option is to create a TDA structure to staff the mission. That course, while a good fix, is fraught with red tape. The answer will lie in structuring a PA “force” from a combination of all options, including individual TDA military and civilian personnel (from all services); contractors; RC soldiers (all services) volunteering under PSRC or TTAD; not-previously-mobilized TPU RC soldiers (and sailors) involuntarily mobilized by the twos and threes in derivative units under PSRC; and continued, albeit judicious use of AC PA units. This will have to be a micro-managed effort, with horsepower exerted from the highest levels to get all the services to play.

August 2000 will mark the four-year anniversary for the demobilization of the first rotation of RC PA units to deploy for the Bosnia contingency. According to McCullough (1999), the DA Working Group studying the mobilization policy proposes that, if these units have seen 100 percent turnover since demobilizing four years earlier, they become candidates to go again. While this is only a recommendation, it underscores the weight that DA assigns to USAREUR’s projections for an open-ended mission. It is extremely unlikely that any units that have gone would be compelled to go again (for this contingency, anyway) before those that have not gone. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), at least, has publicly stated that this would not happen on his watch. Nevertheless, FORSCOM as the force provider must look first to the readiest units available. In goodwill compliance with the CAR’s wishes, the writer, in his capacity as Public Affairs Organization Integrator at FORSCOM,

has avoided forecasting the re-use of any unit flags before the end of the 12th rotation in 2002 (the six-year anniversary of the redeployment of the first rotation's units, and when we run out of units). But as pointed out above, the Bosnia call-ups do not exist in a vacuum; other contingencies may require the mobilization and deployment of RC PA units coincident with the Bosnia contingency. OPTEMPO is on the increase. Reservists and Guardsmen will take heed.

Reference List

Austin, Lt. Col. Marian L. (1999, June 21). Re: TDA Structure? E-mail. Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA), Washington, DC.

Bell, Lt. Col. (P) Hiram. (1999, June 23). TDA Structure. E-mail. U.S. Army Public Affairs Proponent Activity, Fort Meade, MD.

Donovon, John. (1999, June 14). Using Army Civilians. Personal interview. Office of the Secretary of the Army for Public Affairs (SAPA), Washington, DC.

Jones, Lt. Col. Geoff; McCullough, Lt. Col. Bridget; Ruegemer, Lt. Col. Alan. (1998, April). Getting Individual Reservists on Active Duty. FORSCOM I-Opener, Issue 7, pp. 14-16: Fort McPherson, GA. (Online internal periodical).

Jones, Lt. Col. Geoff. (1997, October). Reserve Units, OPTEMPO and the Bosnia Contingency. FORSCOM I-Opener, Number 1-98, pp. 5-8: Fort McPherson, GA. (Online internal periodical).

Jones, Lt. Col. Geoff. (April 1999). Update on PA Units for Operation JOINT FORGE. FORSCOM I-Opener, Issue 17, pp. 8-10: Fort McPherson, GA. (Online internal periodical).

McAllister, Bill. (1999, June 22). Shedding Reserve on Defense; OMB to Let Military Contract Out Thousands of Jobs. The Washington Post.

McCullough, Lt. Col. Mary B. (1999, June 9). Working Group Review of HQDA Mobilization Policy Under the PSRC. Information Paper. DAMO-ODOM.

Reimer, Gen. Dennis J. (n.d.) One Team-One Fight-One Future. (Online). Internet: http://www.paed.army.mil/acrc/oneteam/ie/AC-RC_Brief_frame.htm.

United States Army. (1995, October 3). Combat Service Support, FM100-10: pp. 1-5, 2-3, 2-11, 3-12, 3-14, 3-16. U.S. Army: Author.

United States Army. (1997, April 1). How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998. Chap. 22, pp. 13-14. War College, U.S. Army: Author.

Zapanta, Ed. (1999, June 15). MOS 46 Soldiers in the IRR. (Online report request). Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.

Figure 1

America's Army Public Affairs Units

	<u>AC</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>USAR</u>
PCH		65 MA/CT/RI 69 CA/NV 126 IN/MI	305 HI, 9 RSC 314 AL, 81 RSC 318 IL, 88 RSC 361 NY, 77 RSC
MPAD	22 Bragg, XVIII C	29 MD/VA 70 MO/AR 100 TX 102 MS/LA 105 KS/NE 107 FL 109 PA 113 PR/VI 114 NH/VT 115 ID/OR 122 WA 123 AZ/NM 124 GA 128 CO/UT 129 ND/SD 131 AL 133 KY TN 135 IA/MN 138 NY 139 IL/WI 196 OH/WV 382 NC/SC 444 NJ/DE	203 KS, 89 RSC 300 GA, 81 RSC 302 CA, 63 RSC 304 WA, 70 RSC 319 SC, 81 RSC 326 PA, 99 RSC 343 AR, 90 RSC 345 TX, 90 RSC 350 IN, 88 RSC 354 PA, 99 RSC 358 UT, 96 RSC 362 NH, 94 RSC 363 MO, 89 RSC 364 MN, 88 RSC 366 IA, 19 TAACOM 367 OH, 88 RSC 372 TN, 81 RSC
BPAD			206 TX, 90 RSC 209 GA, 81 RSC 222 CA, 63 RSC 356 MD, 99 RSC
PAD	4 Hood, III/1Cav 11 Polk, XVIII/2ACR 13 Hood, III/4ID 14 Carson, III/3ACR 17 Shafter, USARPAC/25ID 19 Riley, III/11ACR 20 Richardson, USARPAC/2ID 27 Drum, XVIII/10ID 28 Lewis, I/-- 40 Campbell, XVIII/101AAD 49 Bragg, XVIII/82ABD 50 Stewart, XVIII/3ID	103 MT 117 HI 134 AK 145 OK 197 WY 715 DC	201 VA, 99 RSC 205 NC, 81 RSC 221 Ger, 7 ARCOM 368 OH, 88 RSC

Figure 2

Public Affairs Units for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, GUARD & FORGE
(as of 1 July 1999)

<u>Loc/Mission</u>	<u>Rtn 1 (IFOR)</u> (*95-'96) (1 st Ar Div)	<u>Rtn 2 (Cov Frce)</u> (*96-'97) (1 st Ar/In Div)	<u>Rtn 3 (SFOR1)</u> (*97) (1 st In Div)	<u>Rtn 4 (SFOR2)</u> (*97-'98) (1 st Ar Div)	<u>Rtn 5 (SFOR3)</u> (*98) (1 st Ar Div)	<u>Rtn 6 (SFOR4)</u> (*98-'99) (1 st Cav Div)
<u>MNDN</u>	361 PCH + (1), (2) 29 MPAD 203 MPAD + (1) 358 MPAD 11 PAD 49 PAD 209 BPAD	367 MPAD + (3) 350 MPAD 100 MPAD + (4)	300 MPAD 364 MPAD 129 MPAD ----- ----- ----- 222 BPAD Det	362 MPAD 372 MPAD 124 MPAD ----- ----- ----- 13 Indivs w/(6)	304 MPAD + (3) 345 MPAD + (7) 196 MPAD ----- ----- ----- 13 Indivs w/(9)	115 MPAD(-) 22 MPAD 319 MPAD ----- ----- ----- 13 Indivs
<u>NSE</u>	221 PAD 113 MPAD	103 PAD 131 MPAD	122 MPAD(-) -----	145 PAD -----	27 PAD -----	115 MPAD Det -----
<u>CR</u>	114 MPAD 715 PAD	135 MPAD + (5) 201 PAD	128 MPAD 130 PAD(-)*	139 MPAD 134 PAD	123 MPAD+ (8) 28 PAD	70 MPAD -----
<u>Loc/Mission</u>	<u>Rtn 7 (SFOR5)</u> (3-10/99) (1 st Cav Div)	<u>Rtn 8 (SFOR6)**</u> (10/99-4/00) (10 th Mtn Div)	<u>Rtn 9 (SFOR7)**#</u> (4-11/00) (49 th Ar Div)	<u>Rtn 10</u> (11/00-6/01) (U'R Div?)	<u>Rtn 11</u> (6/01-1/02) (U'R Div?)	<u>Rtn 12</u> (1/02-8/02) (?)
<u>MNDN</u>	314 PCH(-)+ (10) 133 MPAD ----- ----- ----- ----- Indiv fills	69 PCH(-) 109 MPAD ----- ----- ----- ----- Indiv fills	65 PCH(-) 102 MPAD ----- ----- ----- ----- Indiv fills	MPAD MPAD ----- ----- ----- ----- Indiv fills	MPAD MPAD ----- ----- ----- ----- Indiv fills	MPAD MPAD ----- ----- ----- ----- Indiv fills
<u>NSE</u>	314 PCH Det -----	69 PCH Det -----	65 PCH Det -----	PAD -----	PAD -----	PAD -----
<u>CR</u>	444 MPAD -----	107 MPAD -----	138 MPAD -----	MPAD PAD?	MPAD PAD?	MPAD ?

Figure 2, continued

Legend:

Rtn = Rotation (unit deployment lengths vary, beginning 12/95).

MNDN = Multinational Division-North (various locs, U.S. Sector, Bosnia).

NSE = National Support Element (Intermediate Support Base, Taszar, Hungary).

CR = Central Region (Heidelberg, Bad Kreuznach and Wuerzburg, Germany, and downrange missions).

Blue = AC

Red = ARNG

Green = USAR

Purple = Composite (AC/RC w/other services)

+ (n) = Units augmenting as Derivitized Unit Identity Code (DUIC) or w/individual fillers:

(1) = 326 MPAD (Flag not sent.) (6) = 222 BPAD (Flag sent Rtn 2; Det sent Rtn 3.)

(2) = 372 MPAD (Flag sent Rtn 4.) (7) = 203 MPAD (Flag sent Rtn 1.)

(3) = 363 MPAD (Flag not sent.) (8) = 65 PCH (Flag not sent.)

(4) = 69 PCH (Flag not sent.) (9) = 209 BPAD (Flag sent Rtn 1.)

(5) = 117 PAD (Flag not sent.) (10) = 302 MPAD (Flag not sent.)

Notes:

Unit to right → replaces unit performing mission. If no unit to right, no follow-on mission. (“-----“ is placeholder for possible ramp-up).

* Unit since inactivated (J-out; no longer in force structure and not counted in Statistics below).

** Rtn 8 (SFOR6) units received Alert Order/NFT 291928Z JAN 99

*# Rtn 9 (SFOR7) units briefed to/approved by FC DCSOPS

Statistics:

-- 82% (61/74) of total PA units are in RC.

-- 38% (5/13) of total AC units deployed thru Rtn 7/SFOR5:

1/1 MPAD – 100%

4/12 PAD – 33%

-- 67% (41/61) of RC PA units deployed thru Rtn 7/SFOR5 (*does not include DUICs*):

2/7 PCH – 29% [0/3 ARNG 2/4 USAR]

28/40 MPAD -- 70% [17/23 ARNG; 11/17 USAR]

6/10 PAD -- 70% [4/6 ARNG; 2/4 USAR]

3/4 BPAD -- 75% [3/4 USAR]

-- 62% (18/29) of USAR PA units deployed thru Rtn 7/SFOR5.

-- 66% (21/32) of ARNG PA units deployed thru Rtn 7/SFOR5.

RC Units Not Yet Deployed or Projected:

122 MPAD(-) 197 PAD

105 MPAD 205 PAD

382 MPAD 368 PAD

302 MPAD 126 PCH

326 MPAD 305 PCH

343 MPAD 318 PCH

354 MPAD 206 BPAD (in carrier status as of Sep 98)

363 MPAD

366 MPAD

Figure 3

MOS 46 SOLDIERS IN THE IRR

GRADE	MOS				TOTAL
	46A	46Q	46R	46Z	
E01	0	3	1	0	4
E02	0	9	1	0	10
E03	0	20	6	0	26
E04	0	79	39	0	118
E05	0	33	22	0	55
E06	0	10	8	0	18
E07	0	11	2	0	13
E08	0	0	0	8	8
E09	0	0	0	1	1
O01	2	0	0	0	2
O03	7	0	0	0	7
O04	8	0	0	0	8
TOTAL	17	165	79	9	270

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.

Figure 4

Historical Record of AC PA Unit Deployments

(Does not include unit soldiers deployed individually)

4th PAD Hood 1st Cav

Operation DESERT STORM
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Dec 92-Feb 93)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Aug-Dec 94)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Aug-Dec 95)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Aug-Dec 96)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Sep-Dec 97)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (May-SEP 99)

11th PAD Polk

GTMO (Jun-Jul 92)
JTF Andrew (Aug-Oct 92)
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Dec 92-Feb 93)
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (Nov 95-Mar 96)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, Kuwait (Sep-Jan 99)

13th PAD Hood 4th ID

Operation DESERT STORM
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Mar 92-Jan 93)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, Kuwait (May-Sep 98)

14th PAD Carson

Cuba (Jan 92)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Aug-Nov 92)
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Dec 92-Mar 93)
JTF-160 (Jun 94)
California Forest Fires (Aug 96)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Apr-Jul 97)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, Kuwait (Jan – May 99)

17th PAD PACOM Shafter

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (95)
JRTC (Fort Polk, LA) (Feb 96)
Exercise ORIENT SHIELD (Japan) (Nov 97)
Exercise COBRA GOLD (Thailand) (Apr-May 98)
JRTC (Feb 99)

19th PAD Riley

Operation DESERT SHIELDISTORM (Nov 90-May 91)
Somalia (92-93)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Oct-Dec 93)
Idaho Forest Fires (Operation WARM LAKE) (Jul-Sep 94)
Exercise VIGILANT WARRIOR (Kuwait) (Oct-Dec 94)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Jul-Sep 97)
Various Deployments, SHAPE, Bosnia, Honduras, (SEP 98-FEB 99)

Figure 4, continued

20th PAD PACOM Richardson

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (94-95)
Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (Guam) (Dec96 - Feb 97)
Exercise NORTHERN EDGE (Alaska) (Mar 97)
Exercise COBRA GOLD (Thailand) (May 97)
Exercise NORTHERN EDGE (Alaska) (Mar 98)

27th PAD Drum

Operation DESERT STORM
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Dec 92-Mar 93)
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (95)
Operation JOINT GUARD (Bosnia) (Feb-Oct 98)

28th PAD Lewis

Operation DESERT STORM
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Dec 92-Mar 93)
Operation JOINT GUARD (Germany) (Feb-Oct 98)

40th PAD Campbell

Operation DESERT STORM
JTF-B (Oct 92-Apr 93)
France (May-Jun 94)
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (Nov 95-Mar 96)
Operation DESERT THUNDER (Kuwait) (98)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, Kuwait (May – Sep 98)

49th PAD Bragg 82nd ABD

Operation DESERT STORM
JTF Andrew (Aug-Oct 92)
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (Nov 95-Mar 96)
Centrazbat (Sep-Oct 97)
Bosnia (returned March 98)
Honduras, Hurricane Mitch (Nov 98-Jan 99)

50th PAD Stewart

Operation DESERT STORM
GTMO (Jul-Aug 92)
JTF Andrew (Aug-Oct 92)
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Apr 93)
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (95)
Exercise BRIGHT STAR (95)
Exercise BRIGHT STAR (97)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, Kuwait(Jan - May 98)
Task Force Hawk, Albania, APR 99-present

22nd MPAD Bragg

Operation DESERT STORM
GTMO (Nov91-Feb 92)
JTF Andrew (Aug-Oct 92)
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION (Kuwait) (93)
Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) (Jan-Apr 93)
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (94-95)
Operation JOINT FORGE, Bosnia (Aug 98 – Feb 99)